The emergence of IS has brought on tectonic shifts in the region. Key players are revising their roles, attitudes and connections. Radio VR is exploring the issue with Dr. Emmanuel Karagiannis and Seyed Ali Alavi in London.
US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has stated that US-led air strikes against the IS could help Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Whether this is really so, or not, still remains to be seen. Yet, one thing is clear: old alliances are tested and new – are being forged.
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Says Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis, Senior Lecturer, Department of Defense Studies, King's College London:
Turkey, unfortunately, has become not part of the solution, but it has become part of the problem. And this is because the Turkey’s Government very-very strongly supported the Syrian opposition. And that means that Turkey immediately alienated itself from the rest of the Syrian society.
So, for the last few years Turkey has considered the Assad regime and the Kurdish rebels fighting in Syria as the enemies, basically. So, that means that Turkey has become, as I said before, the part of the problem. It has taken the side in the Syrian conflict.
And it is a very difficult situation for Turkey now, because it is obvious that the support towards the Syrian opposition is politically risky. The Syrian opposition is a very diverse movement; it is not a homogeneous movement.
So, the sections of the Syrian opposition that, let’s say, are pro-Western and more moderate are becoming less influential. Now most of the Syrian opposition movement is controlled by the radical forces, either by al-Nusra, which is, as you know, an Al Qaeda affiliated organization, or even worse – it is controlled by the IS.
So, for Turkey that is politically risky. It has to pay a huge price for this decision to support the Syrian opposition. And currently I think that Turkey’s foreign policy is under a revision, it is very likely to see some major changes towards a more, let’s say, neutral or less active foreign policy in Syria.
But do I get it right that the Turkish Government does not see the IS as a threat to its own stability?
Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis: This is true and this is only because the IS has not tried to undermine the Turkish national security. It has not threatened Turkey directly. Actually, the IS has target three enemies of Turkey: first of all – the Assad regime, secondly, the Kurdish rebels that are close to PKK in Turkey and then, of course, the Iraqi Shia.
So, for the Turkey’s Government the IS was not a priority for many months, because, again, they targeted the enemies of Turkey, they didn’t target Turkey itself.
But now it has become very difficult for Turkish Government to maintain this position. As you know, the IS has been identified by most of the Western countries as a very important threat for the Western security.
So, it is difficult for Turkey to remain rather neutral towards the IS. They have to take sides; they have to change their position. And sooner or later they will have to participate in the operation against the IS either directly by contributing forces, or by allowing the NATO forces, the Western forces to use the Turkish airspace against the IS.
When we are talking about Turkey, you are saying that one of the reasons why Turkey got into this kind of awkward position is because it used to support all kinds of rebels forces in Syria. Now, when we look at the composition of the anti-IS international coalition, it looks like most members of that coalition used to indiscriminately support all the rebel forces in Syria, too. What is the difference?
Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis: The major difference is between all these fractions of the Syrian opposition. I will remind you that we have the Free Syrian Army, which is the force of, let’s say, moderation. I mean, they are rather pro-Western, they want to establish the Syrian republic and they think that in this new country the minorities could have a position.
Then, we have more radical elements. We have the Kurdish rebels that want to establish an autonomous entity in the northeastern part of Syria. So, the Syrian opposition is not a monolithic movement. It is a very diverse movement; it is not homogenous at all. Different groups have different agendas.
But, unfortunately, in the last few years it looks like the radical elements within the Syrian opposition are very strong and are more influential. And the moderate forces, like the Free Syrian Army, it looks like they are weaker, it looks like they don’t control enough territory.
And, of course, there is the civil war within the civil war in Syria. We have many battles between the radicals and moderates, between al-Nusra and the IS, between al-Nusra and the Free Syrian Army.
So, it is not a war just between the Government forces and the anti-Government forces. We also have the civil war within the opposition. And sometimes it is very sad. I mean, we have a lot of casualties coming out of that civil war, out of this second civil war in Syria.
On the other hand, the American Government is planning to support the more moderate opposition in Syria, to arm it, to give it the necessary resources to oppose the radicals, including the IS. But if the moderates have already proved to be rather helpless in the face of the radical opposition, what is the use?
Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis: Yes, I think there was the window of opportunity for the US Government to provide some military assistance, let’s say, provide some training to those moderate forces, maybe, two years ago. It doesn't look like an option anymore.
Why? Because, first of all, the moderate forces of the opposition, as I said before, are rather weak. Most of the recruitment now is done by the radical forces. So, in plain figures, they are losing the human resources. They don’t have enough human resources to put into this effort, to fight for the moderate opposition against the radical opposition.
And the second thing that the Americans aren’t taking into account is that many members of the moderate Syria opposition have deflected to the radical forces. So, they are not so reliable, as they would like to present themselves.
So, there are many second thoughts, I think, in Washington regarding the military assistance, regarding the arms to the opposition. They worry that if they do this, these arms might end up in the hands of the radical forces and, eventually, will be used against the US or against the US allies.
So, I think that window of opportunity is not there anymore for the US. They will have to do their job themselves. They will have to somehow engage in this war and make sure that the IS doesn’t anymore control so much territory, that the IS cannot undermine the security of countries like Jordan or Turkey etc.
I don’t think that they have the option to seriously transform the Syrian moderate opposition into a reliable, well-trained force that can fight against the IS anymore.
German special service, the BND, published a report, saying that allegedly the IS would be in a good position to sustain all kinds of strikes in Iraq. And now we see the Prime Minister of Iraq travelling to Iran. Is the visit related to the anti-IS effort?
Dr Emmanuel Karagiannis: In general, we know that airpower is not usually enough to change the situation on the ground. I mean, in most cases of that kind at some point there was a need to send ground troops, to engage with the insurgents, the terrorists etc.
So, the airpower, at least in these kinds of situations, I think cannot make a huge difference. I will remind that this is not a conventional army. The IS is an army of insurgents, they don’t wear uniforms. Most likely you will find them in the community. It is difficult to differentiate the IS insurgents from the rest of the civilian population.
So, my point is that there are some limitations on what the US Government can achieve on the ground. And that is obviously making the Iraqi Government and other governments in the region very nervous. They feel very insecure about the near future.
So, the moves of that kind, I mean the Iraqi Government trying to find a solution to this problem not in Washington but in Tehran, I think it is a more or less logical and a well calculated move, because the Iranians also worry about the growth of the IS. They have a very close relationship, as you know, with the current Iraqi Government. So, naturally, the Iraqi policy makers are trying to bring along the Iranian state.
And we know, of course, that there already is a heavy Iranian involvement in this war against the IS not just in Syria, but also in Iraq. We know that the Iranians are helping the Assad regime. We know that they are helping the Iraqi Government. We know that there are some special forces from Iran that currently are in Syria and Iraq. So, it is not really a surprise that the Iraqi Government is trying to reach out to the Iranians.
Says Seyed Ali Alavi, PhD student, a Middle East analyst at the School of Oriental Studies in London:
Basically, the danger that the IS imposes in the region highlights the importance of Iran geopolitically, socially and strategically. Iran from the very beginning supports the Iraqi central Government and the Kurdistan regional Government logistically, to fight against the IS terrorists. So, the emergence of the IS as the threat for the peace in the region, of course, it brings Tehran and Baghdad closer together. And needless to say that in post 2003 these two states have close connections.
As far as I understand, the official point of view in Iran is that the IS is a creation of the West?
Seyed Ali Alavi: Tehran is not formally part of any coalition against the IS, or against any other groups. But from the very beginning of the emergence of the IS Iran has been on the frontline against the IS terrorists, because and Tehran sees them as their ideological enemy. And also, Iran supports Baghdad and the Kurdistan regional Government logistically. Even, both Tehran and Baghdad have admitted that if not the Iran’s logistical support, Baghdad could fall in the hands of the IS terrorists. The Iranian military consultants are actively operating in Iraq to support the Iraqi and the Kurdish governments to fight against the IS.
Of course, the emergence of the IS can change the geopolitical conditions in the region as well, because you see that Turkey, on the other hand, is quite reluctant in fighting against the IS or supporting Iraq and the Kurdish forces against the IS. But on the other hand, you see Iran doing exactly the opposite. So, that makes Tehran and Baghdad closer. And both countries are publically announcing that Tehran is heavily supporting Baghdad and Erbil against the IS.
But on the other hand, from the announcements and declarations it seems that Iran is not willing to join any Western coalition against any groups, because they believe that the source of instability is supported by some regional governments. So, that makes it more complicated, but Iran is in the frontline from the very beginning.
The current situation actually reminds me of 2005-2006. If you remember at the time when the US wanted to pull out from Iraq, Americans also invited Iran to use its influence on the Shia community in Iraq.
Seyed Ali Alavi: It is quite a misunderstanding. As far as we can see, Iran is not actually supporting the Americans and did not support the Americans in Iraq. But they have a historical connection to those in power in Baghdad, because during the Saddam Hussein regime, most of these officials that are in the Government in Baghdad, they had very close connection to Tehran. And some of them are living in Iran as refugees, and some of them have facilitated the support. So, Iran has got a deep historical connection with the new Government in Baghdad since post 2003.
What Iran is doing, as they say, is that they are supporting their old ideological allies and friends in Iraq. Yes, of course, Iran was criticized by some regional governments, but, on the other hand, was quite encouraged by the Iraqi Government to support. And also, Iran has deep historical roots in terms of the connection to Iraq. And it has got more than one thousand kilometer borderline with Iraq. So, it is not possible to dismiss Iran’s crucial role in the stability of Iraq.
And curiously enough, the emergence of every such crisis makes Iran stronger. Though, as far as I understand, the US would find it difficult to acknowledge the fact.
Seyed Ali Alavi: Yes, exactly true!
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